E-CKN seminar | China in the Arctic and Implications for the EU

EVENT OVERVIEW 

On 28 January 2026, the Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS), the Dutch China Knowledge Network (CKN), and the Swedish National China Centre convened a closed door online discussion on “China in the Arctic and its implications for the EU,” which was moderated by Bernhard Bartsch, Director of External Relations at MERICS. The discussion brought together key experts on this topic; Helena Legarda (Head of Program for the Foreign Relations Team, MERICS), Louise van Schaik (Head of EU & Global Affairs, Clingendael Institute), and Patrik Andersson (Analyst, Swedish National China Centre at UI), and was followed by a Q&A with the audience. The discussion primarily focused on China’s strategy and ambitions vis-a-vis the Arctic, China–Russia cooperation in this region and the implications for Greenland and the European security architecture. The event was organized in the framework of the European China Knowledge Network (E-CKN). E-CKN is an initiative by the German Mercator Institute for China Studies, the Dutch China Knowledge Network and Swedish National China Centre. E-CKN partners with key Brussels-based organizations and other (cross-)national efforts to expand and connect China expertise across Europe.

CHINA’S STRATEGY IN THE ARCTIC

China does not view the Arctic as part of the global commons; instead, it sees the Arctic as a “strategic new frontier“. China’s competition with Western countries is increasingly moving into new areas Beijing views as critical to its strategic ambitions (outer space, the polar regions, cyberspace, and the deep sea). As these domains become more accessible, China is expanding its dual-use activities there as part of its push to become a leading global power. Beijing sees these “strategic new frontiers” as opportunities to strengthen its military and technological capabilities and to expand its global influence at the expense of Western dominance. This concept has now entered the mainstream discourse in China, though it is communicated differently to domestic and foreign audiences. Externally, China emphasizes win-win cooperation and multilateralism in the context of “strategic new frontiers”. However, domestically, the narrative clearly articulates China’s ambition to establish dominance and control in the Arctic. Helena Legarda identified several key characteristics of China’s strategy in the Arctic:

• China tends to lead with what can be called “presence before power”; often research projects precede other activities. For example, China has two research stations in the Arctic (Yellow River Station in Svalbard, Norway and the China-Iceland Arctic Science Observatory in northern Iceland). 
• Much of China’s presence in these domains relies on dual-use technologies and activities; for instance, satellites as well as in the framework of research projects, certain instruments gather relevant data that can support future military as well as broader security and strategic operations in these environments.  
• Ideally, China intends to operate alone, but for now, it is leaning on Russia as its collaboration partner to gain access to the Arctic. To this end, we are already seeing China’s push for a new form of Arctic governance that would give more states from outside the Arctic region a greater say.

Regarding China’s presence in the Arctic, it is also important to note that, contrary to US President Trump's claims, Chinese submarines are not operating near Greenland. However, Chinese ships are present along the Northern Sea Route. Louise van Schaik recalled that in 2020 China showed significant interest in Greenland due to opportunities in fishing, infrastructure investment, and critical mineral mining. However, China quickly encountered several obstacles, including high mining costs, logistical and technical challenges, falling commodity prices, and local opposition driven by environmental concerns. As a result, China’s presence in Greenland is overall very limited currently.

CHINA RUSSIA COOPERATION IN THE ARCTIC

Sino-Russian cooperation in the Arctic has increased significantly. Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia has become more dependent on China for cooperation in the region; for example, Chinese companies have expanded their role in financing and purchasing liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Russia’s Arctic projects, helping Moscow offset the loss of Western investment and markets following sanctions. However, concerns and mutual distrust persist, particularly with regard to Russian sovereignty. Patrik Andersson emphasized that China–Russia cooperation must be carefully analyzed by distinguishing between the different areas in which the two countries cooperate and by assessing their joint versus independent activities. Cooperation on energy and shipping projects predates the Russian invasion of Ukraine, whereas mining cooperation remains at an early stage. In particular, cooperation on critical minerals is progressing slowly due to China’s reluctance to share technology. Military cooperation includes joint exercises extending into Arctic areas, although these remain largely symbolic rather than strategic. In terms of Arctic governance, the two powers have historically differed in their positions. Russia has traditionally supported the status quo, as the Arctic Council ensures influence for Arctic states. China, by contrast, has long advocated for a new governance model that grants greater influence to non-Arctic states. More recently, Russia has shown increased openness to this approach.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EU

Unlike China, Europe has long lacked a geostrategic approach to the Arctic. For a long time, the Arctic was primarily discussed in the context of climate change. The shift in Europe’s immediate strategic environment is not yet reflected in European institutional thinking. However, one can expect an increased allocation of European financial resources and the development of new security strategies to address the (increasing) challenges. European states will need to determine which Arctic governance model best serves the interests of the European Union (EU) and promote it in a coordinated manner. In addition, European infrastructure development will need to keep pace with and actively participate in emerging Arctic shipping routes and mineral extraction. Although there has been no significant presence of Chinese submarines near Europe's northern borders thus far, Europe will eventually need to address how to protect undersea cables from espionage and sabotage.